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Abstract The dual-use problem is an ethical quandary sometimes faced by sci-
entists and others in a position to influence the creation or dissemination of scientific
knowledge. It arises when (i) an agent is considering whether to pursue some project
likely to result in the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge, (ii) that
knowledge could be used in both morally desirable and morally undesirable ways,
and (iii) the risk of undesirable use is sufficiently high that it is not clear that the
agent may permissibly pursue the project or policy. Agents said to be faced with
dual-use problems have frequently responded by appealing to a view that I call
scientific isolationism. This is, roughly, the view that scientific decisions may be
made without morally appraising the likely uses of the scientific knowledge whose
production or dissemination is at stake. I consider whether scientific isolationism
can be justified in a form that would indeed provide a way out of dual-use problems.
I first argue for a presumption against a strong form of isolationism, and then
examine four arguments that might be thought to override this presumption. The
most promising of these arguments appeals to the idea of a division of moral labour,
but I argue that even this argument can sustain at most a highly attenuated form of
scientific isolationism and that this variant of isolationism has little practical import
for discussions of the dual-use problem.
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1 The dual-use problem
Some nuclear physicists working in the first half of last century found themselves
confronted with an ethical quandary. As they saw it, there were good reasons to seek
the knowledge that they sought: not only was there a case for regarding that
knowledge as valuable in itself, it was also plausible that the knowledge would have
desirable applications, for example, in deterring warfare. However, there were
reasons to refrain from seeking this knowledge too, since there was a risk that it
would be misused, for example in unjustified nuclear attacks. Some physicists were
sufficiently concerned about the risk of misuse that they were uncertain whether
they ought to continue with their scientific work. There is, for example, evidence
that several participants and potential participants in the Manhattan Project—the
United States effort which lead to the development of the atomic bomb—were
sufficiently concerned about the risk of misuse that they were ambivalent about
whether they ought to be participating in the project.1
These physicists took themselves to be confronted with a quandary that has
recently become known as the dual-use problem.2 We can understand this as the
quandary arising whenever
(1) An agent faces a choice whether to pursue P, where P is a policy or project
such that pursuing P is likely to result in (i) the creation of new scientific
knowledge, or (ii) the wider dissemination of existing scientific knowledge,
and
(2) The knowledge whose creation or dissemination is at stake could be used in
both morally desirable and morally undesirable ways, and
(3) The risk that this knowledge will be misused (that is, used in morally
undesirable ways) is sufficiently serious that it is unclear whether the agent is
morally permitted to pursue P.3
Note that although this formulation of the dual-use problem, like many other
formulations in the literature, explicitly refers only to two conflicting values—
morally desirable uses of knowledge, and morally undesirable uses—other
considerations could potentially contribute to the problem. Whether the risk of
misuse is sufficiently high that it is unclear whether the agent should pursue P may
depend not only on how the risk of misuse compares to the prospect of morally
1 See, for discussion, Glover (1999, pp. 92–93), Bostrom (2007), and Lakoff (1980).
2 The quandary is also sometimes known as the dual-use dilemma, but I prefer dual-use problem since it
is not clear that there is a genuine moral dilemma—in the sense of a choice structure in which the agent
cannot but act wrongly—in these cases. I present the dual-use problem here as a problem that arises in
relation to the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge, but others have also used the term to
refer to the analogous quandary that can arise in the creation or dissemination of technologies. Note that
the term ‘dual-use’ has also been used, in a different, non-normative sense, to refer to the fact that
knowledge or technologies developed for military purposes may have unforeseen civilian benefits. See,
for an example of this usage, King (2005). For discussion of the term, see Selgelid (2013).
3 I take the seriousness of the risk of misuse to be a function of both the moral undesirability of the use
and the likelihood with which the use will occur.
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desirable uses, but also, for example, on whether the knowledge will be valuable in
itself, on whether the agent has made commitments to or not to pursue P, and
various other factors.4
Some further brief clarifications may be helpful. First, the dual-use problem can,
on the above formulation, arise both in relation to the creation of new scientific
knowledge and the dissemination of existing scientific knowledge. Second, although
this problem is often exemplified by reference to decisions faced by individual
scientists, on the above formulation it can also arise for other individual agents (for
example, science policymakers and journal editors) and, and, assuming collective
agency is possible, for collectives (perhaps including the scientific community,
national governments and society-at-large). Note also that the choice faced by the
agent could be a choice about a particular project (for example, a particular
scientific study) or about a general policy (for example, a choice about whether to
require censorship of scientific journals or ‘classification’ of certain scientific
information). The dual-use problem can thus arise at multiple levels.
It can also arise in otherwise very different areas of intellectual inquiry. The
classic examples of the dual-use problem come from early and mid-twentieth
century nuclear physics. However, recent ethical discussion of the dilemma has
focused on the life sciences. It has been suggested that some research in molecular
biology poses dual-use problems because the knowledge it produces could be used
to create human pathogens or other biological agents whose intentional or negligent
release into the environment would have devastating consequences. Discussion of
this concern was triggered in part by developments in genome synthesis which have
been taken to hold out the prospect of creating ‘designer’ pathogens or recreating
historical pathogens, such as the smallpox virus or the 1918 Spanish Influenza virus,
to which most people are no longer likely to be immune.5 Discussion has been
stimulated further by two studies which resulted in the creation of variants of the
H5N1 influenza virus that were transmissible by air between ferrets (and thus,
perhaps, between humans).6
Neuroscience is another scientific area in which dual-use problems have been
thought to arise (Dando 2005, 2011; Marks 2010). For example, rapid development
recently in neuroimaging—particularly in functional magnetic resonance imaging—
has provided new research tools for neuroscientists, and new diagnostic and
prognostic tools for clinicians. But it is possible that new imaging technologies will
also have applications in lie-detection. There are thus concerns that they might be
used to violate privacy, perhaps as an aid to unethical interrogation practices (Wolpe
et al. 2010). Neuroscientists are also beginning to understand the neural bases of
various human behaviours. For example, there has been a flurry or work recently on
4 For discussion of a number of other values that could be relevant to dual-use problems, see Buchanan
and Kelley (2011).
5 For examples of scientific developments that have driven this discussion, see Jackson et al. (2001), who
report the accidental creation of a vaccine-resistent and highly lethal strain of the mousepox virus; Cello
et al. (2002), who report the synthesis of a complete poliovirus genome using chemicals purchased over
the internet, and based on genomic information also freely available on the net; and Tumpey et al. (2005),
who report the re-creation, also through synthetic techniques, of the 1918 Spanish influenza virus.
6 For concise summaries of the studies and ensuing debate, see Evans (2013) and Vogel (2014).
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the role of the hormone and neurotransmitter oxytocin in facilitating trust and other
so-called ‘pro-social’ behaviours (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2005; Baumgartner et al. 2008;
De Dreu et al. 2011), and it has been suggested that this work could be misused, for
example, by those who wish to covertly manipulate the behaviour of others (Dando
2011).
2 Scientific isolationism
An agent who takes herself to be faced with a dual-use problem, or who is
reasonably thought to by others to face one, plausibly bears a deliberative burden.
She may not simply ignore the putative problem; she must address it in some way.
There are two obvious ways in which she might discharge this burden. First, she
might attempt to resolve the problem by conducting what I will call a use
assessment. This would involve determining the likely uses of the knowledge at
stake and then determining, partly on the basis of this assessment, whether she is
morally permitted to proceed. Second, she might attempt to escape the problem.
That is, she may attempt to change her circumstances such that the problem no
longer arises. For example, it may sometimes be possible to escape a dual-use
problem by developing some new means for preventing the misuse of the
knowledge whose creation or dissemination is at stake without thereby foregoing
desirable uses of the knowledge. Concerns about the misuse of scientific knowledge
may then no longer provide any reason to refrain from pursuing P.
Historically, however, many agents who have been confronted with dual-use
problems have neither sought to resolve them, nor to escape them, nor indeed to
discharge the putative deliberative obligation in any other way. Instead, they have
sought to deny that any such obligation exists, maintaining that they may continue to
promote scientific knowledge without resolving or escaping the problem. Often this
claim is made rather obliquely. Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the Manhattan project
who himself expressed ambivalence about his work said, in attempting to justify it, ‘‘[i]t
is my judgment in these things that when you see something that is technically sweet,
you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had
your technical success’’.7 This is ostensibly a purely descriptive claim. But given that it
was intended partly to diffuse moral criticism, it is clearly meant to imply that scientists
should or at least may permissibly ‘go ahead’ and argue about it later.
In other cases agents confronted with dual-use problems have come closer to
flatly denying that they are under any obligation to assess the likely uses of the
scientific knowledge whose creation or dissemination is at stake. Some, for instance,
have sought to draw a clear distinction between science and technology, or between
research and development, maintaining that questions about morally desirable and
undesirable applications become relevant only in the realm of development or
technology. For example, in response to the publication of a story about cruise
missile technology in the science section of Time, the Nobel Laureate Roger
Guillemin stated that ‘‘[w]hat is going on there [cruise missile development] is not
7 Quoted in Jungk (1970, p. 266).
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science but technology and engineering…. The use, including misuse or ill use, of…
knowledge is the realm of politicians, engineers and technologists’’.8 Guillemin can
plausibly be interpreted as claiming here that only in the realm of technology need
one appraise the uses of scientific knowledge. The implication is that in science, use
assessments can be eschewed; choices about which scientific project(s) if any to
pursue or promote may be made purely on the basis of scientific considerations, for
example, whether a given piece of knowledge is intrinsically or theoretically
interesting.9 I will refer to this view as scientific isolationism, since it holds that
decisions about the direction of science can be made in isolation from certain moral,
nonscientific considerations.
If scientific isolationism is correct, then an agent reasonably supposed to be faced
with a dual-use problem can simply deny that she needs to address that putative
problem, since she is permitted to ignore the likely applications of a piece of
knowledge in deciding whether to contribute to its production or dissemination. She
is thus permitted to ignore the very factor—risk of morally undesirable uses—that is
thought to generate the problem. The thought would presumably be either that how
scientific knowledge will be used has no bearing on the moral permissibility of the
agent’s actions, so that there is no real problem at all, or that it is has a bearing, but
one that the agent is morally permitted to ignore in her deliberations.
Scientific isolationism has implications that extend beyond debates regarding the
dual-use problem and the misuse of science. Indeed, the view has perhaps most
frequently been invoked not in defence of science that may be used in morally
undesirable ways, but in defence of science deemed to have no plausible morally
desirable uses. Marie Curie famously reminded an audience at Vassar College that
We must not forget that when radium was discovered no one knew that it would
prove useful in hospitals. The work was one of pure science. And this is a proof
that scientific work must not be considered from the point of view of the direct
usefulness of it. It must be done for itself, for the beauty of science, and then there
is always the chance that a scientific discovery may become like the radium a
benefit for humanity.10
Curie is here invoking a variant of scientific isolationism to defend the pursuit of
basic science that will not clearly yield any social benefit.
In what follows, however, I will focus on the implications of scientific
isolationism for scientific work that is amenable to misuse. I will consider whether it
is possible to defend a form of scientific isolationism that does indeed allow agents
putatively faced with dual-use problems to eschew any appraisal of the likely uses
of the scientific knowledge at stake.
8 Roger Guillemin, in a letter to the editor, Time (September 3, 1979), p. 5. Quoted in Lakoff (1980,
p. 101). See, for discussion, Glover (1999, p. 102).
9 See, for discussion, Daniels (1967).
10 Marie Curie in a Lecture at Vassar College, May 14, 1921. Quoted in Bostrom (2007, p. 145). Note
that Curie’s claim here is in fact significantly stronger than scientific isolationism, as I defined that view
above. She claims not social utility may be ignored, but that it ‘must’. However, since must implies may,




Before proceeding to the argument proper, however, it will be necessary to offer
some further preliminary remarks on scientific isolationism.
First, scientific isolationism should be distinguished from a different view with
which it is frequently coupled. This is view that the state, and others outside the
scientific community, ought to leave those within it a wide domain of freedom in
selecting their scientific aims, and their means to achieving them (see, e.g., Bush
1945, pp. 234–235). Let us call this view scientific libertarianism.11 Scientific
isolationism and scientific libertarianism are frequently defended together. For
example, in his classic discussion, Bush (1945) moves directly from the claim that
‘‘[w]e must remove the rigid controls which we have had to impose [during World
War Two], and recover freedom of inquiry’’, an expression of scientific
libertarianism, to the claim that ‘‘[s]cientific progress on a broad front results from
the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the
manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown’’, arguably an
expression of scientific isolationism (1945: 235). Indeed, the two views can
plausibly be regarded as two aspects of the same, broader model of the relationship
between science and society—a model that is often associated with the Enlight-
enment.12 According to this model, science should be autonomous from the rest of
society. One statement of the view has it that ‘‘the only scientific citizens are
scientists themselves’’ and that ‘‘for science to engage in the production of properly
scientific knowledge it must live in a ‘free state’ and in a domain apart from the rest
of society’’ (Elam and Bertilson 2002, p. 133). We could perhaps aptly characterise
this model as the conjunction of scientific libertarianism—which asserts that science
should be granted political autonomy from the rest of society—and scientific
isolationism—which grants it a kind of moral autonomy.
Nevertheless, scientific libertarianism and scientific isolationism are distinct
views, and they have different implications for dual-use problems. Scientific
libertarianism might be drawn upon to resolve certain dual-use problems. Consider a
case where a government is deciding whether to institute state censorship of
scientific publications in a sensitive area, such as synthetic biology, and is
reasonably deemed to be faced with a dual-use problem. Perhaps the government
can resolve this putative problem by appealing to scientific libertarianism. If that
view is correct, then clearly state censorship would be unjustified. However, though
scientific libertarianism may allow agents to resolve dual-use problems in some
circumstances, it will not enable the resolution of all such problems. Suppose that an
individual scientist is considering whether to disseminate some item of scientific
knowledge, free from any legal impediment to doing so, and takes herself to be
11 In Hohfeldian terms, scientific libertarianism ascribes to members of the scientific community a moral
claim-right to freedom from external interference in their scientific decision-making. Scientific
isolationism, by contrast, assigns scientists (and others) a moral permission; a permission to eschew
any moral appraisal of the likely uses of scientific knowledge.
12 This is the term given to it by Bostrom (2007). Arguably this conception of science gained the
ascendancy much later than the Enlightenment. It has been argued that, in the US, it came to the fore only
in the 1870s. See, for discussion, Daniels (1967).
Scientific isolationism 91
123
faced with a dual-use problem. Here, scientific libertarianism will provide no
guidance, for there is no question of constraining scientific freedom in this case; the
issue what the scientist should do given the freedom she has been granted.
So scientific libertarianism does not allow us to resolve all dual-use problems.
Scientific isolationism does, however, potentially provide a way out of all dual-use
problems, for it denies that the consideration that generates such problems—the risk
that scientific knowledge will be misused—needs to be considered.
But is scientific isolationism itself justified? In what follows I subject the view to
critical scrutiny. I take as my initial target the following, rather strong variant of
scientific isolationism:
Full Isolationism. For any policy or project P, moral agents considering whether
to pursue P are not morally required to assess the likely uses of the scientific
knowledge at stake (that is, the knowledge whose creation or dissemination is
likely to be affected by the agent’s choice whether to pursue P).
This variant of isolationism is strong in two respects. First, it deems that agents
may always permissibly ignore the use of the knowledge they produce. Second, Full
Isolationism applies to all agents, regardless of their institutional role. For example,
it applies to scientists, university administrators, government executives, and
members of the general public. It also applies to both individual and collective
agents, assuming that there are collective agents. Thus, it may apply to science
funders, universities and governments.
It might seem uncharitable to take, as my target, such a strong version of scientific
isolationism. However, I begin with this strong variant not because I wish to exclude
weaker, and perhaps more plausible, variants; indeed I will turn to consider weaker
variants of scientific isolationism in Sects. 6, 7 and 8. Rather, I begin with this strong
variant because this will enable me to approach the assessment of scientific
isolationism in a systematic way. My assessment proceeds in three steps. First, I set up
a presumption against Full Isolationism. Second, I consider two arguments that might
be thought to override this presumption and thus justify Full Isolationism. I argue that
both fail. Finally, I consider whether it might be possible to defend a weaker version of
scientific isolationism that can nevertheless do the work that has been asked of
stronger versions. The aim of the subsequent discussion is thus not only (and indeed is
not primarily) to assess Full Isolationism, but also to determine whether it is possible
to defend any version of scientific isolationism that will allow those faced with
putative dual-use problems to deny an obligation to resolve or escape those problems.
I believe that this aim is one that is worth pursuing even if Full Isolationism is
implausible. It would, after all, be quite consistent to hold that Full Isolationism is
implausible while also suspecting that it might contain a kernel of truth, and perhaps a
kernel that will be helpful to those faced with dual-use problems.
4 The presumption against Full Isolationism
The argument for a presumption against Full Isolationism begins from a parallel
between science and other domains. Outside of the realm of science, we generally
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think that, when an agent is deciding whether to facilitate the production or
dissemination of a tool that is amenable to both morally desirable and undesirable
uses, that agent should take into account its likely uses.
Consider the case of arms manufacturers. Most would judge that, in deciding
whether to produce certain kinds of weapons, or to sell them to certain kinds of
customer, arms manufacturers should consider the risk of misuse. Similarly, most
would judge that in deciding whether to permit or support the production and sales
of such arms, governments should take the possible misuse of those weapons into
account.
It might be thought that weapons are a special case because they are so clearly
amenable to misuse. But note that we would probably take a similar view about
items whose potential for misuse is less obvious. For example, we would think that
risk of misuse ought to be taken into account by those who manufacture and sell
components that could be used to produce weapons, but which are primarily used
for morally desirable or neutral purposes. And we would think that governments
should consider risk of misuse in deciding how to regulate the production and sale
of such components.
Similarly, consider those who manufacture and sell chemicals with legitimate
uses (such as household cleaning agents) but which can also be used to manufacture
unsafe and illicit drugs. Again, most would think that, in considering whether to
manufacture such chemicals, and whether to sell them to certain kinds of customer,
the manufacturers ought to consider the risk of misuse. Similarly, we would think
that the government should take the risk of misuse into account in deciding whether
and how to regulate the production and sale of such chemicals.
More generally, when tools are amenable to both morally desirable and
undesirable uses, we generally judge that their likely uses should, at least in some
cases, be taken into account when decisions that affect the creation or dissemination
of those tools are made. We think that some rudimentary form of use assessment
should be conducted. This, I suggest, creates a presumption in favour of the parallel
view regarding scientific knowledge which is, after all, also a tool amenable to both
morally desirable and undesirable uses.
It is true that those who produce tools amenable to both good and bad uses
sometimes seek to deny any obligation to perform a use assessment. For example,
arms manufacturers may claim that they need not consider the possible uses
(including misuse) of the arms they produce and sell because they are not directly
responsible for the misuse of those arms. Nor do they intend the arms to be
misused.13 Such appeals are, however, widely regarded as unpersuasive. The facts
that arms manufacturers do not intend misuse, and are not directly responsible for it,
may somewhat weaken their obligation to conduct use assessments. But most of us
nevertheless think that, at least in some cases, such an obligation is present.
13 Arms manufacturers could appeal here to the Doctrine of Double Effect. For a discussion of double-
effect reasoning in relation to the dual-use problem, see Uniacke (2013).
Scientific isolationism 93
123
5 The noninstrumental value of knowledge
I have been arguing for a presumption against Full Isolationism. In this section and
the next I consider two arguments for Full Isolationism that might be thought to
override this presumption.
The first of these arguments appeals to the view that scientific knowledge has
noninstrumental value—value that does not derive from its tendency to produce
other things of value. This view has frequently been invoked by those who wish to
defend their participation in the production or dissemination of knowledge that is
prone to misuse (Glover 1999, p. 102), and one can see how it might function in a
defence of Full Isolationism. The thought could be that pursuing a project or policy
P that is likely to result in the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge is
morally permissible just in case the scientific knowledge at stake has (a sufficient
degree of) noninstrumental value, so there is no need for those deciding whether to
promote the creation or dissemination of knowledge to consider what instrumental
value or disvalue it might have in virtue of the ways in which it will be used.
Consideration of instrumental value would be superfluous. Indeed, it might be worse
than superfluous; it might potentially distract those considering whether to pursue P
from the more important matter of determining the likely noninstrumental value of
the scientific knowledge at stake.
This argument depends on two claims. First, that knowledge is (or at least can be)
noninstrumentally valuable. And second, that the noninstrumental value of a piece
of knowledge is the sole determinant of whether it would be justified to pursue a
project or policy likely to result in the creation or dissemination of scientific
knowledge. But note that the second of these claims does not follow from the first.
One could hold that knowledge is noninstrumentally valuable, but that its
instrumental value is also relevant to decisions regarding whether to pursue P.
Indeed, if knowledge has both instrumental and noninstrumental value, the natural
position to hold would be that both types of value bear on such decisions. The view
that instrumental value is irrelevant would be plausible only if the noninstrumental
value of knowledge were a trump value, one that always over-rides the sorts of
value or disvalue attached to good or bad applications of that knowledge—or at
least a value that will have overriding force in all but extra-ordinary circumstances.
But it is not clear why is should be so. Indeed, accepting that the noninstrumental
value of knowledge is a trump value would have implausible implications. It would
arguably imply, for example, that compared to the status quo, vastly greater
resources should be expended on supporting science, and vastly fewer on other
projects. Healthcare, education, social security, defence and so on should be
supported only insofar as they are conducive to scientific progress.
6 Uncertainty
A second argument for Full Isolationism would appeal to the uncertainty that will
afflict any attempt to conduct what I earlier called ‘use assessments’—that is,
attempts to determine the likely applications of the scientific knowledge whose
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creation or dissemination is likely to be affected by the decision whether to pursue
P, and a determination, partly on the basis of this assessment, of whether it is
morally permissible to pursue P. This uncertainty could stem from at least two
sources. First, there is the problem that it will often be unclear in advance what
knowledge will be created or disseminated through pursuit of P.14 Thus, suppose
that an individual scientist is considering whether to pursue some project
investigating x. It will presumably be somewhat predictable that this project could
yield knowledge concerning x. But the content of that knowledge will generally not
be clear in advance. If it were, there would be no need to pursue the knowledge.
Similarly, it may be quite likely that the project will in fact yield knowledge about
some other topic, y. Thus, when a scientist is faced with a question about whether to
seek to produce knowledge of a certain kind, there will typically be uncertainty
about what knowledge will actually be produced. (The same kind of uncertainty will
not exist, or not to the same degree, in relation to the dissemination of existing
knowledge.) Second, there will typically be uncertainty about how a given item of
knowledge will be used. The possible applications of a given item of knowledge
will often be unclear, and highly dependent on unpredictable contextual factors
(such as which people acquire the knowledge).15
We can distinguish two different ways in which these concerns about uncertainty
might figure in an argument for Full Isolationism. First, they might be invoked in
support of the claim that attempting to determine the uses of scientific knowledge is
always futile.16 It never has any predictive value regarding how the knowledge that
would in fact be created or disseminated due to pursuit of P would in fact be used.
Second, they might be invoked in support of the claim that the costs of attempting to
engage in such use assessments outweigh the benefits.
The first of these arguments seems difficult to sustain. Suppose scientists are
considering whether to disseminate some piece of knowledge from, say, nuclear
physics or synthetic biology. Suppose further that there is a clear mechanism via
which the scientific knowledge might be used to produce weapons as well as clear
evidence that some individuals or groups are interested in producing and using such
weapons for the purposes of terrorism. We would, I think, be inclined to judge that
the scientific knowledge in question is, ceteris paribus, more likely to be used for
terrorist purposes than knowledge in relation to which we know of no similar
14 See, for a classic statement of this view, Bush (1945, p. 241).
15 There may also be moral uncertainty. Even if we could fully specify a likely use of the knowledge,
there might be uncertainty about its moral (un)desirability, and about how its moral (un)desirability bears
on the moral permissibility of pursuing P. I leave aside moral uncertainty here, since it is not normally
thought a sufficient ground for eschewing deliberation in the face of putative moral quandaries. But see
Briggle (2014) for a detailed discussion of the ways in which moral uncertainty has been neglected in
recent discussions of the social impacts of science.
16 Microbiologist Vincent Racaniello defended this view forcefully in a debate over the recent H5N1
ferret studies, claiming that ‘‘[f]or much of science you can’t do a risk–benefit analysis. If you think you
can, you’re wrong’’ (Quoted in Roos 2012). Michael Polanyi (2000, p. 9) puts the point more generally,
holding that ‘‘the aspiration of guiding the progress of science into socially beneficent channels [is]
impossible and nonsensical’’, and then (p. 10): ‘‘You can kill or mutilate the advance of science, you
cannot shape it. For it can advance only by essentially unpredictable steps, pursuing problems of its own,
and the practical benefits of these advances will be incidental and hence doubly unpredictable’’.
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mechanisms and motivations. It would be implausible to suggest that information
about these mechanisms and motivations has no predictive value.17
At this point, a defender of Full Isolationism might retreat to the second of the
two arguments mentioned above. She might concede that concerns regarding
uncertainty do not render use assessments entirely futile, but claim that they do
substantially diminish the payoffs from attempting to make such assessments, and
substantially enough that the costs of making the assessments outweigh the benefits.
This supporter of Full Isolationism might note that attempts to conduct use
assessments are likely to come at considerable cost; to make these assessments well,
it is likely that significant time, effort, expertise and financial resources would be
required—all resources that could otherwise be devoted to other worthwhile
activities. And if those use assessments would in any case be plagued by substantial
uncertainty, the costs of conducting them might outweigh the benefits.
Concerns about the costliness of use assessments are likely to be particularly
serious in the case of individual scientists. If individual scientists were to conduct
use assessments in relation to each experiment they undertook or paper that they
published, this would be highly burdensome and would significantly reduce the time
available for doing scientific work. Note, however, that this concern could be
significantly mitigated by outsourcing much of the necessary work to external
agencies. One can imagine a situation in which scientists could consult an agency
whose sole role was to provide specialist advice on how various types of scientific
knowledge are likely to be used, as well, perhaps, as evaluations of how these
different uses bear, morally, on the scientist. Individual scientists would then be left
only with the tasks of predicting what knowledge their work might produce and
deciding whether to rely on the assessments of the specialist agency. This agency
could also provide assessments to policymakers, journal editors and other individual
and collective agents in a position to influence the creation and dissemination of
scientific knowledge.18
Note also that rejecting Full Isolationism does not commit one to the view that
use assessments must be formed on the basis of explicit calculation and reasoning.
Rejecting Full Isolationism entails accepting that use assessments should sometimes
be made, but this is consistent with believing that those assessments could be made
on the basis of simple heuristics (e.g. ‘research with obvious applications in warfare
17 It might be argued that, in order for a piece of scientific knowledge to have such clear military
applications, it would have to be the result of highly applied scientific work, and by the time the science
on a given topic has proceeded to such an applied stage, there may seem to be little hope of preventing
further scientific progress on the topic in question; the field may already have acquired significant
momentum. Thus, those in a position to support or impede scientific work may be faced with a variant of
the Collingridge dilemma (see Collingridge 1980): either they act before the scientific work has reached
an applied stage, in which case they may be able to influence whether further scientific knowledge is
produced, but they have no predictive ability, or they act at an applied stage, where they have some
predictive ability, but no ability to influence the production of scientific knowledge. However, it seems to
me doubtful that there are many cases in which nothing can be done to hold back the production of a piece
of scientific knowledge. See Sect. 7 below for some considerations in support of these doubts.
18 The US National Science Foundation’s ‘Science of Science and Innovation Programme’ is an example
of a recent attempt to develop expert advice on the likely social effects of science. For a critical
discussion, see Briggle (2014).
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is, other things being equal, more likely to be used for military purposes than other
research’) or even intuition, and if decisions were made in these ways it is not clear
that they would be associated with substantial costs.
I have been presenting some grounds for doubting that (1) making use assessments
in relation to scientific knowledge is futile, and (2) the costs of making such estimates
are outweighed by the benefits. There is, moreover, some reason to suppose that these
doubts are decisive. This can be seen by returning to the analogy between scientific
knowledge and other tools amenable to both morally desirable and undesirable uses.
The arguments concerning uncertainty that I offered above would, it seems to me,
apply with equal force to certain other instances in which one agent contributes to the
production or dissemination of a tool amenable to both good and bad uses. Suppose the
government is considering whether to allow arms manufacturers within its jurisdiction
to sell weapons to rebels in a country currently in the midst of a civil war. The
complexities that typify such conflicts will likely introduce a high degree of
uncertainty regarding how any weapons sold might be used, particularly if, as it seems
we should, we take long term uses into account. Nevertheless, few would argue that, in
such a situation, the government could plausibly ignore the likely uses of the arms
whose sale is in question. We would not think, in such a situation, that uncertainty is
sufficiently great so as to make use assessments futile, and moreover we would likely
assume there to be ways of making such assessments such that their benefits will
outweigh their costs. It is not obvious that the degree of uncertainty involved in use
assessments in relation to scientific knowledge are substantially greater than those
involved in this case—particularly if we limit ourselves to the applied sciences, where
uncertainty regarding potential applications is arguably lessened. Thus, our intuition
that uncertainty does not provide a decisive ground for eschewing use assessments in
the arms sale case plausibly provides some evidence for the view that it does not
constitute a decisive ground in the scientific knowledge case either.19
7 Weakening scientific isolationism
I have argued that there should be a presumption against Full Isolationism, and I have
been unable to identify any argument capable of overriding that presumption. But I
now want to consider whether it might be possible to salvage some kernel of truth from
scientific isolationism. Consider the following, weaker variant of the principle:
Restricted Isolationism. For any policy or project P, individual researchers
and research groups considering whether to pursue P are not morally required
to morally appraise the likely uses of the scientific knowledge at stake.
This principle differs from Full Isolationism in that it applies only to individual
researchers and individual research groups. It does not apply, for example, to the
scientific community as a whole, to governments, or to humanity as a whole. One
might think that Oppenheimer, Guillemin, Curie, and other scientists who have
19 For a similar argument, see Bostrom (2007).
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asserted similar views, had no stronger variant of scientific isolationism in mind
than Restricted Isolationism, for they do not explicitly include governments or other
institutions within the scope of their comments. Moreover, restricting the scope of
scientific isolationism in this way arguably renders it more plausible. It allows us to
avail ourselves of at least two arguments that were not previously available.
8 Lack of influence
The first of these arguments maintains that individual scientists and research
institutions need not engage in use assessments because any action based on such
assessments would be futile: individual scientists and research institutions cannot
significantly alter the rate of knowledge production or dissemination. If one scientist
or institution decides to abstain from producing or disseminating some piece of
scientific knowledge because of the risk of misuse, this same knowledge will shortly
be produced or disseminated by someone else.20
This argument depends on empirical claims that I am not qualified to answer;
claims regarding the effect of scientists’ actions. Nevertheless, I wish to raise three
doubts about the argument.
First, there is some anecdotal evidence that individual scientists can sometimes
have a significant effect on the rate of scientific progress. Consider the case of recent
research by Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka’s groups demonstrating that the
H5N1 virus can be rendered transmissible by air between ferrets.21 Following
significant debate over whether papers based on these studies should be published in
full, both researchers and a number of others agreed, in January 2012, to halt, for
60 days, ‘‘any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses
leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals’’
(Fouchier et al. 2012, p. 443). This voluntary moratorium in fact lasted a year
(Fouchier et al. 2013). Since the moratorium was voluntary, any of the scientists
who agreed to it could have defected from it at any time. In this context, the fact that
each scientist chose to hold to the moratorium delayed research in this area by up to
a year.22 Delays of this order or magnitude—months to years—could plausibly be
sufficient for the development of new regulations or defensive strategies that would
mitigate the risk that a piece of knowledge would be misused.
Second, it is possible that even very slight delays in the production or
dissemination of knowledge could have very significant cumulative effects in the
longer term. Since later discoveries build on earlier ones, it seems possible that a
small delay in one area of research will have large knock on effects, leading to many
20 See, for example, Vandermolen (2006). For discussion, see Bostrom (2007, p. 11).
21 See, for discussion, Evans (2013) and Vogel (2014).
22 Similar points hold in relation to the moratorium on recombinant DNA research agreed by a large
group of American molecular biologists in mid-1974. This moratorium lasted until the now-famous
Asilomar Conference, which took place in February 1925 and resulted in a broad-based agreement on
guidelines regarding the conditions under which recombinant DNA research ought to proceed—
guidelines which were themselves widely respected. For a brief overview of this case, see Berg (2008).
98 T. Douglas
123
more delays in other areas of research. If all of these are areas of research are prone
to misuse, then the overall delaying effect on risk of misuse may be significant.
Third, even if individual scientists cannot significantly affect the rate at which
scientific knowledge is produced and disseminated, they may still be morally
required to conduct use assessments. This is because individual scientists may have
reason to ensure that they do not become part of a collective that wrongfully enables
the misuse of scientific knowledge, even if their own individual contribution to such
misuse would be insignificant. Compare the ethics of contributing to climate
change. It is sometimes said that the individual consumption decisions of individual
people do not significantly contribute to climate change. However, even if this is so,
many would argue that individuals have reasons to consider their carbon footprint,
and to make consumption decisions that reduce it. A plausible explanation for this is
that in making consumption decisions with a high carbon footprint, an individual
becomes part of a collective which together wrongfully produces climate change.23
Arguably, individuals have a reason not to become a part of collective wrongdoing
in this way. Similar reasoning might be applied to dual-use cases. Suppose an
individual scientist creates knowledge about how to render the H5N1 virus air-
transmissible that is highly liable to misuse. However, suppose that this individual
scientist’s work does not significantly contribute to this risk. Still, by creating this
knowledge, the scientist might become part of a collective (say, the group of
scientists working on means for creating air-transmissible H5N1) that does
substantially contribute to this risk. Each individual scientist might be obliged
conduct a use assessment to ensure that they do not become part of collective
wrongdoing in this way.
9 The division of moral labour
I have suggested that the first argument for Restricted Isolationism faces three
problems. I think there is, though, a more promising argument for Restricted
Isolationism. This argument appeals to the idea of an efficient division of moral
labour; the idea that we can sometimes achieve moral goals more efficiently by
assigning different moral responsibilities to different people or institutions rather
than assigning all individuals the same responsibilities. In the context of the dual-
use problem, the idea would be that we can most efficiently ensure that science
serves the public good by assigning responsibility for conducting use assessments to
governments, expert bodies or other institutions, leaving scientists free to pursue
scientific goals with the regulatory frameworks set by these other agents and
institutions.
The basic idea of the division of moral labour is familiar in political philosophy
from the work of John Rawls, who argues that we should accept a division of moral
labour in which only institutions (or more precisely the subset of institutions that he




refers to as ‘the basic structure’) should be assigned responsibility for realising
distributive justice. Rawls (1993, pp. 268–269) spells out the idea as follows:
what we look for is an institutional division of labor between the basic
structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and associations and to
be followed by them in particular transactions. If this division of labor can be
established, individuals and associations are then left free to advance their
ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure, secure in
the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary corrections to
preserve background justice are being made.24
The idea of a division of moral labour is also arguably a part of common sense
moral thinking regarding a number of spheres of human activity. For example, it is a
part of common sense thinking about law and medicine. It is standardly thought that
lawyers operating in an adversarial legal system ought ordinarily to act in the
interests of their own clients, setting aside the interests of those with whom their
client is in dispute, leaving those who maintain and uphold legal institutions to
ensure that the adversarial system generally yields just verdicts. Similarly,
according to a widely held view of medical ethics, a doctor ought to act in the
best interests of the patient she is currently treating, while institutions of healthcare
resource allocation ought to constrain the treatments open to doctors in order to
ensure that healthcare resources are allocated fairly and efficiently.
The division of moral labour is also arguably a feature of common sense thinking
about capitalism. Economic agents in capitalist societies often inflict significant
harms on one another through their competitive practices. Consider the case of a
shopkeeper who drops his prices in order to force a new competitor out of his
market. This action may cause significant harm to the new competitor—the sort of
harm that, outside the context of capitalism, we might expect to be given significant
consideration in deliberation. However, some would argue that, within capitalist
systems, economic agents are morally permitted to engage in practices like
aggressive price competition without considering the harm that this might cause to
others. They are permitted to do this, it might be argued, because, although
individual actions performed within a capitalist system may cause net harm, the
system that allows individual economic agents to ignore market-based harms while
a central government regulates the market to serve the common good is the
economic system that, as a matter of fact, most efficiently serves the common good.
A similar argument could be offered for Restricted Isolationism. It could be argued
that researchers should be free to pursue scientific objectives regardless of how the
resulting knowledge will be used, because the scientific ethos that allows such
aggressive pursuit of the truth within external regulatory constraints is the system of
knowledge production that most efficiently serves the common good. There are at
least three reasons to suppose that such a division of moral labour might be highly
efficient. First, it would help to avoid the duplication of moral labour that would occur
if both individual scientists and those who regulate them were to conduct use
24 For subsequent influential discussions of the division of moral labour in political philosophy, see
Nagel (1995), Murphy (1999) and Scheffler (2005).
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assessments in relation to the same scientific activities. Second, it would allow for
responsibilities to be assigned to those best placed to discharge them. For example,
responsibility for assessing the scientific merit of research could be assigned to
scientists who are highly qualified to make such assessments, while responsibilities
for conducting use assessments could be assigned to agencies that possess a mixture of
scientific, security and ethical expertise. Third, centralisation of use assessments
might allow for substantial economies of scale. For example, the institutions assigned
responsibility for conducting use assessments may be able to conduct those
assessments in relation to general kinds of scientific research thus obviating the need
for use assessments to be conducted in relation to individual projects.
I have been suggesting that the idea of a division of moral labour is a widely
accepted one. We have also now seen that there are reasons to think that a division
of labour that assigns responsibility for conducting use assessments to regulatory
institutions rather than individual scientists would aid efficiency. Nevertheless, I
doubt that an appeal to the division of moral labour can sustain even the restricted
version of scientific isolationism currently under consideration.
There are two difficulties. First, the division of moral labour argument that I have
been outlining specifies an ideal. It specifies an ideal distribution of moral labour
across agents and institutions—a distribution that would allow for maximal efficiency
in the realisation of (certain) moral objectives. But realising this ideal requires
collective action. It requires that both scientists and regulators play their part—both
fulfil the responsibilities assigned to them. Suppose that one party does not play its
part. For example, suppose that regulators do not regulate science so as to ensure that it
serves the public good. Then it is not clear that the other group should fulfil only those
responsibilities that it would be fulfil in an ideal division of moral labour, for there is
no longer any hope that the ideal will be realised. For example, if regulators are not
fulfilling their responsibilities, then there is no longer any hope of distributing moral
labour so as to realise the economies of scale that would attached to a centralised use-
assessment process. Nor is there any possibility of distributing moral labour such that
use assessments are performed by those best qualified to perform them, since those
bodies are, we are assuming, not fulfilling their responsibilities.
These thoughts are relevant since it is plausible that scientific governance bodies
are not currently conducting the use assessments that they would conduct in a
maximally efficient division of moral labour. Some steps have been taken in recent
years to introduce a form of centralised use assessment for certain kinds of scientific
research, particularly in relation to the dissemination of scientific knowledge. For
example, the United States’ National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has
taken on an advisory role in relation to the publication of microbiological research
deemed to be at risk of misuse. However, for many potential dual-use problems,
there is no provision for use assessments to be made by the institutions of scientific
governance. For instance, though most developed jurisdictions operate comprehen-
sive systems for the ethical oversight of human subject research, the institutions
which carry out ethical review (for example, Institutional Review Boards and
Research Ethics Committees) are not generally instructed to consider the risk that
knowledge produced by scientific research will be misused. Their focus is on the
means by which the scientific work will be conducted. Moreover, research that does
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not involve human subjects is not typically subjected to ethical review, though it
may, of course, pose dual-use problems. Similarly, though many research funders
take into account the likely desirable uses of scientific knowledge when making
decisions about which scientific projects to fund, most do not consider the risk that
the knowledge will be used in undesirable ways.25 These gaps in existing
institutional arrangements for preventing the misuse of scientific knowledge might
lead one to conclude that, even if the optimally efficient division of moral labour
would have use assessments conducted by governance bodies rather than individual
scientists, this is a division of labour that scientists cannot currently realise, since
governance bodies are not playing their part.26
A second difficulty is that it is doubtful whether the optimally efficient division
of labour would lead leave scientists with no obligation to conduct use assessments.
Compare two possible divisions of moral labour. In the first, scientists need not ever
conduct use assessments in relation to their work. Institutions of scientific
governance are the only bodies assigned responsibility for conducting use
assessments. In the second division of labour, most use assessments are conducted
by governance bodies, but individual scientists and research groups must conduct at
least cursory use assessments in certain cases—cases where there is a clear and
severe risk that the scientific knowledge they plan to produce or disseminate will be
used in highly undesirable ways, and this despite the optimal preventative policies
having been adopted by governance bodies. It is difficult to see how this latter
division of moral labour could be less efficient than the former. For the
responsibilities placed on scientists and research groups in the latter division of
labour would not, overall, be burdensome—only a cursory use assessment is
required, and it will be required only in rare cases—yet it is plausible that the latter
division of moral labour could prevent some seriously undesirable uses of scientific
knowledge. Compared to the second, more qualified, division of labour, the first,
more extreme division might seem to leave society dangerously exposed to the
misuse of science for the sake of a minor reduction of the deliberative burdens on
scientists.
These thoughts suggest that, at the very most, the idea of the division of moral
labour will support an even further weakened version of scientific isolationism
according to which in the majority of cases, scientists faced with choices about
whether to promote the creation or dissemination of scientific knowledge need not
consider how the resulting knowledge is likely to be misused, but according to
25 Though a number of United Kingdom funding bodies did recently take steps in the direction of taking
risk of misuse of knowledge into account. These funding bodies now require grant applicants to declare
the risks of misuse associated with their proposed work. See BBSRC et al. (2005).
26 An analogue of this argument might be fairly widely accepted in relation to capitalism. I mentioned
above a common sense division of moral labour view according to which individual economic agents
should pursue their own self-interest in their economic transactions, while governance bodies ensure that
market system serves the public good. However, there are certain areas in which governance bodies are
plausibly failing to fulfil the responsibilities that they would be assigned in this division of moral labour.
For example, governance bodies are arguably not effectively protecting the environment and animals
against harm from capitalism, and for this reason, many would argue that, even if in an ideal capitalist
system individual agents would not need to consider the effects of their economic transactions on the
environment and animals, in actual economic systems, they are required to do so.
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which in rare cases—for example, where there is a clear and severe risk of misuse—
at least a cursory use assessment must be performed.
Notice, however, that this further-weakened version of scientific isolationism will be
of little use to those who wish to invoke scientific isolationism in order to avoid an
obligation to resolve dual-use problems. This is because most agree that dual-use
problems normally only arise in cases were there is a clear and severe risk of a highly
undesirable use of knowledge. It is normally thought that only in these cases is there a
serious question about whether it would be permissible to pursue a project or policy that
can be expected to result in the creation or dissemination of that knowledge. But these
are precisely the cases in which the present, further-weakened version of scientific
isolationism will provide no means of escape. For this version of scientific isolationism
accepts that, in these circumstances, scientists ought to conduct use assessments.
10 Conclusion
Not having been able to identify any good argument for either Full or Restricted
Isolationism, I tentatively conclude that we should accept neither. I think we should
accept, that is, that there are cases in which agents reasonably thought to be faced
with dual-use problems—including individual scientists—should morally appraise
the likely uses of the scientific knowledge at stake. The most we can salvage from
scientific isolationism is, I think, the idea, suggested by the division of moral labour
argument, that individual researchers and research groups may permissibly eschew
any moral appraisal of the likely uses of the knowledge they produce or disseminate
in most cases. However, as we have seen, this variant of scientific isolationism has
little dialectic force as a means of avoiding the need to resolve dual-use problems.
Moreover, the argument for this view relies on the assumption that governance
bodies are playing their part in the realisation of the optimally efficient division of
moral labour, and this could be questioned.
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